First commitdevelop

1 files changed, 154 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/linux-lts-6.13-rc5-blob/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch b/linux-lts-6.13-rc5-blob/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7725291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/linux-lts-6.13-rc5-blob/0001-ZEN-Add-sysctl-and-CONFIG-to-disallow-unprivileged-C.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+From d0c6bedb9c49fdd994f469309a4e2668134b4e5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig)" <jan.steffens@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 04:53:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] ZEN: Add sysctl and CONFIG to disallow unprivileged
+ CLONE_NEWUSER
+
+Our default behavior continues to match the vanilla kernel.
+---
+ include/linux/user_namespace.h |  4 ++++
+ init/Kconfig                   | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ kernel/fork.c                  | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ kernel/sysctl.c                | 12 ++++++++++++
+ kernel/user_namespace.c        |  7 +++++++
+ 5 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+index 6030a8235617..60b7fe5fa74a 100644
+--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
++++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ static inline void set_userns_rlimit_max(struct user_namespace *ns,
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
+ 
++extern int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++
+ static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
+ {
+ 	if (ns)
+@@ -189,6 +191,8 @@ extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
+ struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns);
+ #else
+ 
++#define unprivileged_userns_clone 0
++
+ static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
+ {
+ 	return &init_user_ns;
+diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
+index 9ffb103fc927..f91ccd3c1456 100644
+--- a/init/Kconfig
++++ b/init/Kconfig
+@@ -1226,6 +1226,22 @@ config USER_NS
+ 
+ 	  If unsure, say N.
+ 
++config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
++	bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
++	default y
++	depends on USER_NS
++	help
++	  When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
++	  new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
++	  has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
++	  exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
++	  paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
++
++	  This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
++	  kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
++
++	  If unsure, say Y.
++
+ config PID_NS
+ 	bool "PID Namespaces"
+ 	default y
+diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
+index 10917c3e1f03..458360cf9bfb 100644
+--- a/kernel/fork.c
++++ b/kernel/fork.c
+@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@
+ #include <linux/user_events.h>
+ #include <linux/iommu.h>
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+@@ -2265,6 +2269,10 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
+ 	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
+ 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ 
++	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
+ 	 * can only be started up within the thread group.
+@@ -3411,6 +3419,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
+ 	if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
+ 		unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
+ 
++	if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
++		err = -EPERM;
++		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
++			goto bad_unshare_out;
++	}
++
+ 	err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		goto bad_unshare_out;
+diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
+index 157f7ce2942d..881fc4f5d61e 100644
+--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
++++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
+ #include <linux/rtmutex.h>
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ /* shared constants to be used in various sysctls */
+ const int sysctl_vals[] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 100, 200, 1000, 3000, INT_MAX, 65535, -1 };
+@@ -1623,6 +1626,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
+ 		.mode		= 0644,
+ 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+ 	},
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
++	{
++		.procname	= "unprivileged_userns_clone",
++		.data		= &unprivileged_userns_clone,
++		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
++		.mode		= 0644,
++		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
++	},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
+ 	{
+ 		.procname	= "tainted",
+diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+index eabe8bcc7042..ac9d1f702086 100644
+--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
++++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@
+ #include <linux/bsearch.h>
+ #include <linux/sort.h>
+ 
++/* sysctl */
++#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
++int unprivileged_userns_clone = 1;
++#else
++int unprivileged_userns_clone;
++#endif
++
+ static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __ro_after_init;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+